

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP

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TO:

| | | ACTION | INFO | DATE | INITIAL |
|----------|-----------|------------|------|------|---------|
| 1 | DCI | | X | | |
| 2 | DDCI | | X | | |
| 3 | EXDIR | | | | |
| 4 | D/ICS | | | | |
| 5 | DDI | | | | |
| 6 | DDA | | | | |
| 7 | DDO | | | | |
| 8 | DDS&T | | | | |
| 9 | Chm/NIC | | X | | |
| 10 | GC | | | | |
| 11 | IG | | | | |
| 12 | Compt | | | | |
| 13 | D/OLL | | | | |
| 14 | D/PAO | | | | |
| 15 | D/PERS | | | | |
| 16 | VC/NIC | | | | |
| 17 | NIO/USSR | | X | | |
| 18 | NIO/SP | | X | | |
| 19 | C/ACIS/DI | | X | | |
| 20 | D/SOVA/DI | | X | | |
| 21 | ES | | X | | |
| 22 | | | | | |
| SUSPENSE | | Date _____ | | | |

Remarks

STAT

[Signature] Executive Secretary

5 Sep 86

Date

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| Executive Registry |
| 86- 4000 |

5 September 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: National Intelligence Officer for USSR
National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs
Chief, Arms Control Intelligence Staff, DI
Director of Soviet Analysis, DI


FROM: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Clarification on Separating Sharing from ABM

1. I left with John Poindexter yesterday the letter which you created for me. He assures me that the NSC had already straightened out the President's position on separating the sharing notion from ABM and treating it as a novation to Nitze. [] will be in the meetings and has it firmly in mind.

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2. Also, a Presidential speech spelling out his sharing concept is scheduled for sometime this month.


William J. Casey



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0-119-TK

Washington, D. C. 20505

4 September 1986

Admiral John M. Poindexter
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Admiral Poindexter:

I hope the US Delegation of Experts on Nuclear and Space Arms is well prepared to clarify, at this week's meetings with the Soviets, some of the murkiness about our position reported in the memoranda on the previous meeting.

This is a potentially serious topic because of what happened during the first of these meetings in Moscow several weeks ago. The US delegation, at various times, used inaccurate descriptions of the President's objectives and was not able to meaningfully answer some of the simplest Soviet questions. For example, it was a serious mistake to tell the Soviets that the US was willing to suspend the ABM Treaty's withdrawal clause of six months.

I would hope the delegation would make clear that the President has not accepted the Soviets' self-serving concept of "non-withdrawal" from the ABM Treaty, but is proposing a new regime that would novate the ABM Treaty under the conditions specified in his letter to Gorbachev. The President's concept, it seems to me, was clearly understood and agreed to at the Cabinet level before the letter was sent.

The impact on the public and the Soviets of the President's letter to the General Secretary should not be undercut by using Soviet terminology or by unauthorized, ad hoc paraphrases of US policy. The negotiating capital and the purpose of the President's initiatives are at risk in this, and should not be squandered by garbles.

Sincerely,

(SIGNED)

William J. Casey

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